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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                      
No:  01-4094
                      
LORI A. BUFFA,
                        Appellant
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE DEPARTMENT OF JUDICIARY;
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION;
JOHN AND JANE DOE; ENTITIES/CORPORATION (1-100);
JOHN AND JANE DOES, 1-100
                      
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Court Judge:  The Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
(D.C. Civ. No. 97-cv-06327)
                      
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
December 10, 2002
Before:  FUENTES, GARTH and WALLACH*, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed:   January 14, 2003)
                                               
OPINION OF THE COURT
                                               
___________________
*Honorable Evan J. Wallach, United States Court of International Trade, sitting by
designation.
2FUENTES, Circuit Judge
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held that Lori Buffa
("Buffa") failed to show a genuine issue of material fact as to her claims for harassment,
hostile work environment and retaliation under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
("NJLAD"), and thus granted summary judgment to the New Jersey State Department of the
Judiciary and the New Jersey Department of Probation ("State Defendants").  Because we
agree that no reasonable jury could find for Buffa based on the facts of this case, we affirm
the Order of the District Court.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
Because we write solely for the parties, our review of the factual background is
limited to that which is necessary to inform our opinion today.  Since October 9, 1990,
Buffa has worked for the entity now known as the New Jersey Department of Probation, as
an investigator in the Child Support Unit.  In late 1991, Buffa was diagnosed with Lyme
Disease and, in 1992, she was diagnosed with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome.
In February 1996, Hazel Hoyle became the Assistant Chief Probation Officer in
Monmouth County.  Robert Hopkins became Chief Probation Officer around the same
time.  All supervisors reported to the Assistant Chief, who was responsible for overseeing
staff, managing cases and making recommendations for discipline.  Jan Budnik was Buffa's
supervisor during the relevant time period.  Buffa worked at the Probation Department for
approximately thirty to 40 days over the six-month period when Hazel Hoyle worked there.
3In her complaint, Buffa alleges that she was discriminated against by the State
Defendants based on the fact that she has Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and based on a
perception that she had AIDS, a handicap under the NJLAD.  Buffa worked from 8:00 am to
4:00 pm, rather than the normal 8:30 am to 4:30 pm working hours of an investigator, due
to her Chronic Fatigue Syndrome.  She claims to have informed Hoyle about this
arrangement, but Hoyle recalls that Buffa told her the schedule was set up because Buffa
was a single mother.  In 1993 Buffa learned that her ex-husband's child had been diagnosed
with AIDS.  Hoyle claims that she did not learn of any illness in Buffa's family until
September 1996, when Buffa requested sick leave, but Buffa claims to have told Hoyle
about her family's problems several days after Hoyle started work in the Probation
Department.
Buffa alleges that Hoyle and other supervisors began a pattern of discrimination
against her after learning of her health problems and her step-daughter's illness.  Buffa
alleges that, due to her health problems, she was the only investigator sent to receive a
complete Hepatitis B vaccine.  Buffa's request for a "voluntary furlough," dated April 10,
1995, was not denied until fifty-seven days later, while a co-worker with a similar request
received an answer the same day that the request was made.  On May 1, 1996, Buffa's fourth
day back from medically documented sick leave, Hoyle reprimanded Buffa in a hostile
manner because her denim dress failed to comply with the dress code.  In the past, other
employees wore denim dresses without being reprimanded.
As a result of the dress incident, Buffa became physically ill and left work, but
4before leaving, she informed her immediate supervisor and Hopkins' administrative 
assistant.  Dr. Lauren Goldstein, Buffa's physician, recommended that Buffa take disability
leave from work and, on May 7, 1996, the doctor wrote Buffa a note advising the State
Defendants that Buffa would be on medical leave from work for four weeks.  While on
disability leave, Buffa received a letter, dated May 29, 1996, from Hoyle informing her that
disciplinary action was being taken against her because: (1) on May 1, 1996, Buffa left
work before 11:30 am without supervisory authority; and (2) on May 2, 1996, Buffa failed
to inform a supervisor of her absence within the time designated by the applicable
collective bargaining agreement.
Buffa returned to work on August 12, 1996, and submitted a doctor's note requesting
that she be allowed to take a one-half hour lunch in order to shorten her work day on
account of her health needs and her children's health needs.  Hoyle delayed a decision on
this request, and after Buffa asked for an expeditious decision, Hoyle called Buffa to a
meeting so that Buffa could explain the reasons for the request.  The line of questioning
pursued by Hoyle brought Buffa to tears.  Subsequently, on September 6, 1996, a hearing
was held regarding the disciplinary action described in the May 29, 1996 letter from Hoyle
to Buffa.  Buffa described the meeting as hostile; however, in the end, the charges against
Buffa were dismissed and she was granted her request of a modified work schedule.
On or about September 11, 1996, Buffa gave a note to Budnik, written by a pediatric
resident at Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital, stating that Buffa was needed at the
hospital to care for her ex-husband's daughter.  Buffa requested two and one half sick days,
5but her request was denied.
On or about September 27, 1996, Buffa claims that she was accused of throwing a
file at another employee.  Upon Budnik's request, Buffa went to Millie Williams,
Supervisor of the Typing Unit, with a request to have filing done.  After Buffa went to see
Williams about the request, Hoyle came to Buffa's unit and stated that "Millie said you went
to her office and threw a memo at her desk."  Buffa alleges that Hoyle requested one of
Buffa's supervisors to prepare a memorandum regarding the incident.  She claims that she
felt harassed and upset by Hoyle's questioning concerning the incident.
On September 30, 1996, due to what Buffa alleges became a stressful and hostile
work environment, Buffa submitted a resignation letter to Judge Lawson, the Assignment
Judge who oversees the Probation Department.  Campagnola informed Buffa that
Campagnola told both Hoyle and Budnik about Buffa's resignation on that day.  However,
Hoyle continued to write letters to Buffa questioning her whereabouts and her failure to
report to work.
On December 29, 1997, Buffa filed a five-count complaint against the State
Defendants alleging violations of the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA") (Counts One,
Two, and Four) and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD") (Counts Three
and Five).  On March 20, 2001, Buffa filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice as to
Counts One, Two and Four.  As a result of the voluntary dismissal, only Counts Three and
Five, under the NJLAD, remained before the District Court.  On April 3, 2001, the Court
denied the State Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the claims filed under the
1 Once a summary judgment order has been entered there is no longer any basis
for dismissing the complaint on which the summary judgment was based.  See e.g.,
Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 121 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999) (instructing
district court judges that they cannot enter summary judgment and then dismiss a
complaint).
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NJLAD remained.  The State Defendants then filed a motion for reconsideration.  On the
motion for reconsideration, by order dated October 9, 2001, the Court granted the State
Defendants summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.1  This appeal followed.
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over a final decision of a district
court.  We exercise plenary review over a district court's grant of summary judgment  and
review the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment
was entered.  See Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 105 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000).  Summary
judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if, viewing the facts in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986).  At the summary judgment stage, the judge's function is not to weigh the evidence
and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
III.  Discussion
A. Motion for Reconsideration
7Buffa first claims that the District Court erred in granting Defendants’ motion for
reconsideration..  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and New Jersey Local Rule
of Civil Procedure 7.1(g), a motion for reconsideration may be granted if: (1) an
intervening change in the controlling law has occurred; (2) evidence not previously
available has become available; or (3) it is necessary to correct a clear error of law or
prevent manifest injustice.  See North River Insurance Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52
F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995).  Local Rule 7.1(g) does not permit a Court to rethink its
previous decision, rather, the rule permits a reconsideration only when “dispositive factual
matters or controlling decisions of law” were presented to the court but were overlooked. 
See Resorts Int’l v. Great Bay Hotel and Casino, 830 F. Supp. 826, 831 (D.N.J. 1992).
In its opinion, the District Court set forth the appropriate standard for a motion for
reconsideration and then recognized that it had overlooked certain arguments, factual
admissions, and relevant caselaw previously set forth by the State Defendants.  For
instance, the district Court overlooked the fact that the Defendants did not dispute that
Buffa had a "disability" under the NJLAD, which the District Court had previously held was
a material issue of disputed fact.  Also, the District Court had overlooked the Defendants'
argument that the conduct of which Buffa complained did not amount to the requisite
"severe or pervasive" discrimination necessary to sustain a harassment claim under Walton
v. Mental Health Assoc. of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 168 F.3d 661 (3d Cir. 1999,
discussed infra.  Noting that some of these admissions and cited cases could impact its
analysis of the State Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the District Court
8concluded that the motion for reconsideration should be granted.  Given the District
Court’s well reasoned analysis, we do not find that it erred in granting the motion for
reconsideration .
B. Harassment/Hostile Work Environment
Buffa next claims that the District Court erred in finding that she had not presented
a triable issue as to her claim of hostile work environment.  In Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us,
Inc., 132 N.J. 587, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that to prove a hostile work
environment in the context of a sexual harassment claim under the NJLAD, a plaintiff must
show “conduct that occurred because of her sex and that a reasonable woman would
consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create
an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment.”  Id. at 603.  In Taylor v.
Metzger, 152 N.J. 490 (1998), the Court held that this same standard also applies to other
types of hostile work environment discrimination claims.  Id. at 498.  The courts of New
Jersey rely upon federal court decisions under Title VII in reviewing hostile work
environment discrimination claims.  Id. at 499-50.  Thus, as the District Court properly
recognized, Buffa must demonstrate that the discrimination she alleges “would not have
occurred but for her [disability]” and that the harassment she suffered was sufficiently
“severe or pervasive” to make a “reasonable person” believe that the workplace conditions
became “hostile and abusive.”  Lehman, 132 N.J. at 603-04.
This Court has previously ruled that evidence demonstrating a poor relationship
9between an employer and an employee is not, by itself, sufficient to sustain a hostile work
environment claim.  See Walton v. Mental Health Association of Southeastern
Pennsylvania, 168 F.3d 661, 667 (3d Cir. 1999).  While Walton involved a claim of
harassment brought under the ADA, the reasoning of the decision applies to the case before
us.  Buffa alleges that Hoyle harassed her and subjected her to a hostile work environment
due to her Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and because Hoyle perceived her as having AIDS.  To
support these allegations, Buffa points to the fact that Hoyle asked her harassing questions
about her need to work a modified schedule and take time off, Hoyle targeted her for
reprimand for wearing a denim dress to work, and Hoyle subjected her to a hostile
disciplinary proceeding regarding what Hoyle believed to be an unexcused absence from
work.  Like the plaintiff in Walton, Buffa has set forth evidence demonstrating that her
relationship with her superior, Hoyle, was poor; however, Buffa has failed to assert facts
that would allow a reasonable jury to find that Hoyle harassed her because of her disability. 
In addition, while Hoyle’s actions may have upset Buffa, those actions, even considered
together, do not constitute severe or pervasive conduct that would lead a reasonable person
to conclude that the Buffa’s work environment was hostile or abusive.  We conclude that
the District Court correctly granted summary judgment to the State Defendants on Buffa’s
hostile work environment claim.
C. Retaliation
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation of retaliation under NJLAD, a
plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) she engaged in
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protected conduct; (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action subsequent to
such activity; and (3) a “causal link” exists between the protected activity and the adverse
action.  See Delli Santi v. CNA Insurance Companies, 88 F.3d 192, 198 (3d Cir. 1996). 
The record reflects that Buffa contacted Joe Barba, the EEOC Officer for the Department
of Probation in Monmouth County, and Cyril Cousins, an ADA Compliance Officer, about
her treatment at work.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Buffa, she
engaged in protected conduct by contacting these individuals to complain about her work
situation.
However, Buffa has failed to demonstrate that she was subjected to an adverse
employment action as a result of her protected conduct.  Because Buffa was not terminated,
her argument focuses on the fact that she was subjected to harassment, intense scrutiny and
overly-critical supervision as a result of having filed grievances.  As analyzed above, these
actions by the State Defendants did not result in a hostile work environment.  Nor do these
actions qualify as adverse employment actions.  While an employee could potentially
suffer an adverse employment action without officially being terminated, Buffa has failed
to set forth evidence indicating that such a situation occurred in this case.  Hoyle
questioned Buffa about her need to take time off from work and work a modified schedule,
criticized Buffa’s work attire on one occasion, and issued a proposed written warning to
Buffa for allegedly unexcused absences, which was later overturned on appeal. Buffa was
never threatened with termination, demoted, urged to resign, or asked to assume lesser job
responsibilities.  In fact, the evidence indicates that the State Defendants changed Buffa’s
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scheduled working hours to accommodate her needs.  At most, Buffa has set forth facts
demonstrating that she had a poor working relationship with her superior.  The District
Court did not err in granting summary judgment to the State Defendants on Buffa’s claim of
retaliation.
D. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages should only be awarded if the defendant’s conduct is wanton,
reckless, malicious or evil-minded.  See Delli Santi v. CNA Insurance Co., 88 F.3d 192,
207 (3d Cir. 1996).  Because Buffa’s claims failed to survive a motion for summary
judgment, the District Court correctly held that Buffa cannot meet the higher threshold
required to justify a punitive damage award.
IV.  Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
_____________________________
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
Kindly file the foregoing Opinion.
    /s/ Julio M. Fuentes     
Circuit Judge
